

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-11 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ( ISO ) W

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O P 261540Z FEB 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1461

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0073

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: VERIFICATION

REF: STATE 39081 (DTG 182116Z FEB 76)

### 1. BEGIN SUMMARY

WE BELIEVE IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE VERIFICATION PROPOSALS TO THE EAST SOON. CONTINUED WESTERN SILENCE IN VIENNA ON THE SUBJECT OF NUMS CAN ONLY CONVEY TO THE EAST A SENSE OF LOW PRIORITY FOR NIMS ON OUR PART.

MOREOVER, IT WILL BE HARD TO CONVINCE CONGRESS THAT THE U.S. MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO GET EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF NIMS IF THE WEST HAD FAILED TO TABLE A POSITION ON THEM IN OVER 2-1/2 YEARS OF NEGOTIATION. WE RECOMMEND (SEE PARA 7 BELOW)

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THAT THE US TABLE A VERIFICATION PROPOSAL IN NATO IN MARCH,

WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF PRESENTING AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT TO THE EAST ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION BY MID-MAY OF THIS YEAR. END SUMMARY

2. WE ARE PLEASED TO NOTE FROM REFTEL THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH FRG HAVE PROGRESSED SO FAR AS TO RESULT IN AGREED BRACKETED DRAFT TEXT ON VERIFICATION FOR SUBMISSION TO NATO.

3. HOWEVER, WE DISAGREE WITH THE FRG ASSESSMENT THAT THERE IS NO REASON NOW TO MOVE AHEAD TO MAKE VERIFICATION PRESENTATION TO THE EAST. ON THE CONTRARY, WE SEE A REAL NEED FOR A MOVE BY THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND AT THE LATEST.

4. WITH THE TABLING OF OPTION III, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE PRESENTED TO THE EAST A COMPLETE AND DETAILED REDUCTION PROPOSAL. EARLIER, THEY TABLED THE ALLIED POSITION ON FLANK SECURITY AND ON STABILIZING MEASURES, THE LATTER IN GREAT DETAIL. OF ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, VERIFICATION, AND PAHRTICULARLY NEGOTIATED INSPEATION , IS THE ONLY SPECIFIC ASPECT WHICH REMAINS TO BE ELABORATED. NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES WOULD BE VALUABLE, BUT THEY WILL ALSO BE ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL TO GET ACCEPTED. YET THE ALLIES HAVE SAID VIRTUALLY NOTHING ABOUT NUMS FOR OVER 2 YEARS, APART FROM REFERENCES TO "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION BY OBSERVERS."

5. IN THE FACE OF EASTERN STATEMENTS OF OPPOSITION TO ANY VERIFICATION MEASURES OTHER THAN NATIONAL TECHINICAL MEANS, CONTINUED WESTERN FAILURE TO PUT FORWARD A POSITION ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES CONVEYS TO THE EAST THE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT THE WEST ATTACHES LOW VALUE TO NIMS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY SO AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE FACT THAT THE US HAS BEEN WILLING TO RELY ON NATIONAL MEANS THROUGHOUT THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, A WESTERN VERIFICATION PROPOSAL FOR NIMS INTRODUCED STILL  
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LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL, FROM A NEGOTIATING VIEWPOINT, HAVE A EVEN MORE DISADVANTAGED POSITION.

6. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATIONS CONVEY THE UNMISTAKABLE MESSAGE TO THE EAST SOON THAT VERIFICATION, AND, IN PARTICULAR, NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES ARE OF REAL IMPORTANCE TO THE WEST. REPETITION OF PREVIOUS GENERALIZED

STATEMENTS, AS THE FRG SUGGESTS (PARA 2, REFTEL), WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.

7. CONSEQUENTLY, WE RECOMMEND THAT, AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH IN EARLY MARCH, WASHINGTON SHOULD TABLE A US VERIFICATION POSITION IN NATO. AS A COMPROMISE WITH THE FRG, WE SUGGEST THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES PROPOSE A PAPER CONTAINING, AS DRAFT NAC GUIDANCE FOR USE EARLY IN THE NEXT ROUND, THE CURRENT US-FRG AGREED TEXT MINUS THE MATERIAL IN BRACKETS, PLACING US SUGGESTIONS ON AERIAL INSPECTION AND TOURING ZONES IN A SEPARATE SECTION OF THE US SUBMISSION FOR STUDY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL NIMS TO BE PROPOSED TO THE EAST AT A LATER DATE.

8. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DEMONSTRATE ON THE RECORD THAT THE US HAS PROPOSED TO ITS NATO ALLIES A COMPLETE SET OF NIMS WHICH, IF ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH AIDES, WOULD ENHANCE CONFIDENCE IN OUR VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE THINK IT WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE AS THE FRG ELECTION CAMPAIGN APPROACHES TO CREATE ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTIES FOR AN FRG GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS BEEN DOING ITS BEST TO COOPERATE WITH US ON MBFR BY INSISTING ON MOBILE GROUND INSPECTION IN AN INITIAL PRESENTATION TO THE EAST. FROM THE PRACTICAL VIEWPOINT, AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE, NO FRG LEADER WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO AGREE TO SUCH MEASURES, EVEN IF OTHER ALLIES INDICATED INTEREST, UNTIL AFTER THE FRG ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER AT THE EARLIEST HENCE, U.S. INSISTENCE THAT THE FIRST DETAILED PRESENTATION ON NIMS TO THE EAST CONTAIN AN EXPLICIT PROPOSAL FOR MOBILE INSPECTION COULD DELAY SUBMISSION OF ANY PROPOSAL UNTIL OCTOBER. SUCH  
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A DELAY WOULD FURTHER DAMAGE THE ALREADY SLIM PROSPECT OF OBTAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO ANY REPEAT ANY KIND OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION. HENCE, OUR RECOMMENDATION FOR A SPLIT APPROACH.

9. NATO CAN ALWAYS ADD FURTHER NIMS TO THIS INITIAL VERIFICATION PROPOSAL. THE INITIAL PRESENTATION TO THE EAST SHOULD NOT AT THAT POSSIBILITY. BUT IT WILL BE HARD TO CONVINCE CONGRESS THAT THE WEST MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO GET NIMS IF IT HAD FAILED TO TABLE A POSITION ON THEM IN OVER 2-1/2 YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** AGREEMENT DRAFT, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 26 FEB 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** saccheem  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976MBFRV00073  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760073-0222  
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**Image Path:**  
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**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 76 STATE 39081  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** saccheem  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 29 JAN 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <29 JAN 2004 by morefirh>; APPROVED <05 AUG 2004 by saccheem>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: VERIFICATION  
**TAGS:** PARM, US, GE, NATO  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006